We aim to systematically track agent-security research across security and software engineering conferences and journals. Because AI venues publish a much larger volume of papers, we collect relevant AI work as comprehensively as possible and continuously expand the bibliography. The collection covers prompt injection, tool and action security, memory poisoning, privacy leakage, agent misuse, benchmarks, red teaming, and system-level defenses. Contributions and corrections are welcome.
| 2026 | 2025 | 2024 |
| Benchmarks and Evaluation | Prompt Injection Attacks | Defenses and Secure Design | Tool and Action Security | Memory, RAG, and Privacy | Agent Misuse and Red Teaming | Preprints |
AI conference entries retain their official presentation labels.
Benchmarks, test environments, and empirical evaluations that measure agent security, harmful task completion, or deployment risk.
Attacks that place malicious instructions in external content, tool streams, retrieval corpora, or multi-step agent context.
Model-level, runtime, and architectural defenses that preserve user intent and constrain agent actions.
Unsafe tool selection, taint propagation, permission control, and action validation in tool-using agents.
Attacks and defenses involving persistent memory, knowledge bases, private data, or cross-tool information flows.
Research on harmful task execution, offensive agents, automated red teaming, and defenses against malicious agents.
Contributions are welcome. Please open an issue or pull request to:
Use the following entry format and prefer an official proceedings, publisher, ACL Anthology, OpenReview, or arXiv link:
- [Paper Title](official-paper-url)
The organization and documentation in this repository are licensed under CC BY 4.0. Individual papers remain copyrighted by their authors and publishers.